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Corporate governance seeks to ensure a fair return on the investment and it also establishes 
incentives and procedures that meet the interests of shareholders while respecting other 
stakeholders’ interests in the organization. Corporate governance has become one of the hottest 
topics of discussion in the circle of regulators, practitioners and academic in the aftermath of recent 
financial crisis. The financial crisis pint points the lack of corporate governance practice and that 
many institutions have taken heed to ensure compliance of corporate governance to win back the 
confidence of investors and regulators. Well-developed theories like agency theory, stewardship 
theory, hegemony theory and transaction cost theory could be used to understand the concept of 
corporate governance. The aims of this research are to anlayse the concept of corporate governance 
and see the level of adherence to corporate governance in emerging economies. The research also 
endeavors to link the cultural influence in the adoption of corporate governance.  As there are only 
limited researches so far on the corporate governance and related issues in emerging markets, this 
research would contribute to the existing knowledge by filling the gap on corporate governance in 
emerging markets.   
 





There is limited research on corporate 
governance practice in developing countries. 
Interest in corporate governance is rapidly 
increasing inside and outside academia. The 
recent economic crisis, financial scandals and 
collapse of many companies in the developed 
and developing markets have attracted the 
attentions of researchers and business 
people to improve the corporate governance 
practices.  
 
International bodies such as OECD 
(Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development), has examined various 
member and non-member countries to 
evaluate their corporate governance systems 
and to provide suggestions for corporations, 
shareholders, and other stakeholders who 
play important roles in improving corporate 
governance systems. The principles 
developed by OECD are considered essential 
for the development of corporate governance 
systems. However, there are various barriers 
to effective implementation of corporate 
governance principles.  
 
Considering the importance of developing 
countries to the future of the world economy, 
the focus of this paper is on the cultural 
influences in adopting effective corporate 
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governance practices in these countries. This 
study will initially explore the theoretical 
background of the corporate governance and 
the culture influence in adoption of corporate 
governance. The paper also explores the 
problems with corporate governance 
systems in developing countries in general 
and it discusses how national culture 




This section analyses corporate governance, 
culture and the relationship between various 





According to Shleifer and Vishny (1997) 
corporate governance is the ways in which 
providers of finance ensure themselves a 
return on their investment. Reed (2002) 
states that corporate governance establishes 
incentives and procedures that meets the 
interests of shareholders while respecting 
other stakeholders’ interests in the 
organization. Ananchotikul and Eichengreen 
(2009) suggest corporate governance plays 
three critical roles. They state that corporate 
governance facilitates and enhances 
corporations’ performance by providing 
incentives that act as motivation factors to 
the corporations’ managers and employees 
so as to improve efficiency of operation, 
return on investment as well as achieve 
sustained growth and development. In 
addition, they state that effective corporate 
governance prevents embezzlement of 
corporate resources by the managers as well 
as limit them from abusing their powers. 
Moreover, they suggest that corporate 
governance gives a means of monitoring the 
behaviors of managers so as to enhance 
corporation accountability as well as 
provision of a cost effective way of protecting 
the interests of the shareholders and the 
society at large against those of the corporate 
insiders. 
 
There are a number of well-developed 
theories that aid researchers in exploring the 
corporate governance issue. Agency theory, 
stewardship theory, hegemony theory and 
transaction cost theory are some of the well 
known theories in this field. Agency theory 
has been extensively used in explaining the 
conflict of interest between investors as the 
principles and the managers as agents 
(Jensen & Meckling 1976). This theory 
implies that agents will be driven by self 
interest rather than willingness to maximize 
the profit for shareholders. In order to solve 
this problem an independent board of 
director is expected to solve this problem 
(Shleifer & Vishny, 1996). Agency theory 
suggests mechanism that rewards managers 
for maximizing shareholders profit. Such 
schemes typically include plans whereby 
executive managers obtain reduced price 
shares to align the interest of managers with 
those of shareholders. 
 
Transaction cost theory is another theory 
that is used in the discussion of corporate 
governance.  This theory first originated from 
Coase’s (1937) work and later developed by 
Williamson who asserted that the purpose of 
governance is to recognize, clarify and 
mitigate all forms of contractual hazards. The 
main purpose of governance according to the 
transaction cost theory is “to clarify the 
carrying out of economic transactions by the 
efficiency of the chosen governance 
structures that have been adapted to carry 
out the transactions at hand” (1996, p.5). As 
per this theory, effective and efficient 
performance of transaction by adopting 
formal and informal structure and rules are 
important than protection of ownership 
rights of shareholders. The transaction cost 
theory discusses 2 types of governances. 
They are Market Governance and 
Governance through Hierarchies. Market 
Governance advocates strict adherence to 
rules of contract and rely on high-powered 
incentives to control managerial 
opportunism and induce managers to take 
appropriate action.  The Governance through  
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Hierarchies introduces monitoring and 
administrative mechanism as a form of 
corporate governance (McClelland & O’Brien, 
2011).  
 
On the contrary to the agency theory, the 
stewardship theory put forward by 
Donaldson and Barney (1990) is a view that 
managers are motivated by intrinsic desire 
for achievement and are ready for challenges. 
They have a desire to do the jobs right and to 
be a good steward of the corporate assets. 
Thus, stewardship theory holds that the 
CEO’s are naturally motivated. A further 
theory in the field of corporate governance is 
managerial hegemony theory that suggests 
boards of directors are statutory additions 
that are controlled by managers and they 
only play a passive role in strategy or 
directing corporation (Mace, 1971; Vance, 
1983). 
 
Various scholars worked on different aspects 
of corporate governance and they have 
examined corporate governance from 
different country perspectives.  Li & Harrison 
(2007) focus on the different source of 
finance across country and examine the 
difference between financing from banks and 
financing from capital market and its impact 
on the structure of corporate governance. 
With regards to the source of finance, 
countries have been classified into bank-
centered (banks are the provider of finance 
to the companies such as Germany and 
Japan) and capital market (capital market is 
the source of the finance for the companies 
like United Kingdom and United states) and 
examines the difference between the two 
systems in term of practices of corporate 




Kroeber and Kluckhohn (1952) suggest 
culture is a vague concept and it implies 
multiple meanings. A well accepted definition 
of culture is by Dutch researcher Geert 
Hofstede (1984): 
 
“Culture is the collective programming of the 
mind which distinguishes the members of 
one group or society from those of another. 
Culture consists of the patterns of thinking 
that parents transfer to their children, 
teachers to their students, friends to their 
friends, leaders to their followers, and 
followers to their leaders. Culture is reflected 
in the meanings people attach to various 
aspects of life; their way of looking at the 
world and their role in it; in their values, that 
is, in what they consider as ‘good’ and ‘evil’; 
in their collective beliefs, what they consider 
as ‘true’ and as ‘false’; in their artistic 
expression, what they consider as beautiful’ 
and as ‘ugly’.” 
 
As this definition implies, values are 
considered as the most fundamental aspect 
of culture.  To understand a culture 
thoroughly, it is essential to understand its 
cultural values. Values form attitudes which 
respectively, shape the people’s behavior. 
Cultural values shape the behavior of all the 
individuals in the society and social 
environment as a whole.  
 
Many scholars developed various 
frameworks to understand national cultures. 
Usually, these frameworks consist of several 
dimensions which are used to explain cross 
cultural differences internationally. Cultural 
values can be measures as for each 
dimension two extreme value are specified 
and each countries cultural value can be 
measured accordingly. To illustrate, Rokeach 
value survey (Thompson, 1982), Schwartz’s 
cultural value dimension (Schwarts, 1999) 
have developed frameworks to explore the 
different components of culture. The two 
most recognized theory of culture are 
developed by Hofstede (1994) and Schwartz 
(2001).  
 
Hofstede states societies’ culture can be 
analyzed across different dimensions 
including, Power Distance Index (PDI), 
Individualism Index (IDV), Masculinity (MAS) 
and Uncertainity Avoidance Index (UAI).  
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Hofstede added one more dimension to his 
theory later which is, Long-term Orientation 
(LTO).  
 
Although, Hofstede’s theoretical framework 
has been accepted by many scholars 
internationally to explain cultural 
differences, Schwartz’s framework seems 
also eligible as he tries to overcome some 
problems with Hofstede’s model. He tried to 
develop a more comprehensive framework 
that has been empirically validated. He 
derived his framework from three basic 
problems that confront societies including; 
the nature of the relation between 
individuals and groups, encouraging 
responsible behavior to safeguard the social 
structure and the management of social and 
natural work. The Schwartz cultural model 
identifies three bipolar dimensions to deal 
with these problems including, 
Embeddedness versus autonomy, Hierarchy 
versus Egalitarianism, and Mastery versus 
Harmony. 
 
Schwartz suggests embeddedness focuses 
the maintenance of status quo and relies on 
values such as order, respect for traditions, 
reciprocation of favor and wisdom. He 
explains autonomy relates to individual 
willingness for independency and pursuing 
their ideas. He describes the hierarchy 
dimension of culture as unequal distribution 
of power. Moreover, egalitarianism is 
explained as showing concern for every 
individual’s welfare and emphasizes on 
values like social justice, equality, 
responsibility and helpfulness.  
 
Comparison of Hofstede and Schwartz 
Cultural Dimension   
                  
Hofstede and Schwartz explain the cultural 
dimensions in a comprehensive manner. 
Despite some conceptual differences, the 
cultural dimensions by Hofstede and 
Schwartz demonstrate some similarities.  
 
Salzmann and Breuer (2005) compare and 
contrast Hofstede and Schwartz cultural  
dimensions. They illustrate that 
Individualism and Collectivism have common 
characteristics with Autonomy versus 
Embededness, since both explain the 
relationship between individual and group. 
The difference would be the values like social 
order and freedom are not explained by 
individualism and collectivism. Another 
dimension of Hofstede; Power Distance, 
which explains the level of inequality in a 
society overlaps with Hierarchy versus 
Egalitarianism in Schwartz model. However, 
the values such as social justice and social 
power are not explained in Hofstede model. 
Masculinity and Feminity explain the 
distribution of roles between male and 
female. Masculinity and Feminity might be 
related to Mastery as both emphasize 
assertiveness, activity and ambition. 
However, Mastery does not include a 
contrast to feminine values. Uncertainty 
Avoidance is another dimension of 
Hofstede’s cultural dimension which is the 
tolerance level of the society for uncertainty 
and ambiguity and refers to individual’s 
search for truth. Uncertainty Avoidance is 
comparable with Harmony dimension of 
Schwartz’s model as both advocate harmony 
and order. The difference between these two 
dimensions is harmony refers to fitting into 
nature, whereas Uncertainty Avoidance 
refers to harmony by a vigorous control of 
uncertainty.  
 
Corporate Governance Predicaments in 
Emerging Markets  
 
Corporate governance systems have been 
considered a significant factor in economic 
development of countries. The main aim of 
corporate governance is to manage the 
company towards success and corporate 
accountability with the objective of 
enhancing shareholders value and protecting 
the long-term interests of stakeholders. 
According to Chan and Cheung (2008) 
emerging markets are the markets with 
newly developed financial market, a short 
operating history, a smaller capital market 
and lower trading volume. 
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Over the last two decades, corporate 
governance has gained tremendous attention 
from academia and the business world.  The 
increasing attention is due to questionable 
practices and scandals of companies. In 
addition, as Reed (2002) suggests that poor 
economic performance of developing 
countries which is blamed on weak corporate 
governance may trigger financial crisis in 
certain regions. As a result, international 
financial organizations such as IMF and the 
World Bank are closely examining the 
corporate governance systems in developing 
countries. The pressure of globalization and 
the fact that more investors turns to equity 
investment internationally, have led 
companies of emerging markets towards a 
comprehensive reform to adopt corporate 
governance practices. 
 
The quality of corporate governance is more 
important to emerging market, as these 
countries need to attract foreign direct 
investment (FDI) to further develop their 
economies. In addition, companies operating 
in developing countries need to improve 
their corporate governance systems, in order 
to decrease their cost of capital. According to 
Cadbury (1999) increasingly, institutional 
investors, banks, mutual funds, base their 
decision on the reputation and corporate 
governance quality. He points out that sound 
systems of corporate governance attracts 
more domestic as well as international 
investors. 
 
The Organization for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) has set up 
international corporate governance 
benchmark principles for investors, 
governments, corporations and other 
stakeholders. However, the implementation 
of these principles in emerging markets is 
particularly challenging. Many emerging 
economies lack the institutional and human 
requirements that are critical to the 
implementation of corporate governance 
principles. There are various institutional, 
economical, political, social and cultural 
barriers to the effective implementation of  
OECD’s corporate governance principles in 
developing countries.` According to Okpara, 
lack of adequate regulatory system, weak 
protection of share holders’ right, lack of law 
enforcement and monitoring are main 
reasons for ineffectiveness of governance 
system in developing countries.  Miller et al. 
(2005) states lack of transparency and  
ineffective board of directors are the main 
reasons for corporate governance 
inefficiencies. 
 
Few researchers have explored the problems 
with corporate governance in emerging 
markets. The main problem of corporate 
governance is explained by Shellfire and 
Vishny (1986). They put forward the “Agency 
theory” to explain the conflict of interest 
between shareholders and managers. They 
argue that shareholders are interested in 
increasing their share value. However, 
managers wish to maximize their power and 
wealth which leads to problems in corporate 
governance. Poker (2011) suggest that 
managers are interested to disclose 
information if the company is performing 
well to receive bonuses and incentives. The 
Agency problem and the need for an 
independent board is more significant in 
emerging market as majority shareholders of 
corporations are family and boards can 
become redundant when activist 
shareholders are family or 
government(Turnbull, 1997). 
 
Adequate regulatory system to protect 
shareholders’ right is a major consideration 
to improve the government system in 
emerging markets. Although, boards of 
directors are assigned to manage the 
company, the shareholders have some 
influence on corporations’ policy. 
Shareholders have a percentage of votes in 
proportions to their shares. If shareholders 
think the management is performing poorly 
they can elect a new board of director and 
subsequently a new management. However, 
truthful board elections are rare. Board 
members are usually selected by other 
member of the board or management.  
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Okpara (2011) suggests shareholders’ rights 
are different across countries. Jiraporn and 
Davidson (2009) examined the strength of 
the shareholders rights by measuring the 
number of restrictive governance provisions 
that restrain the shareholders right.  
 
Okpara (2011) states that the major problem 
in developing countries is the lack of 
protection of minority shareholders. He 
explains even though there are countries that 
introduced laws to protect the right of 
shareholders, there is no enforcement 
system. He also points out that the 
shareholder’s lack of knowledge regarding 
their rights is another major issue in these 
countries. La Porta et al. (1997, 1998) 
proposed an index to measure the legal 
protection to investors. Many researchers 
have worked to examine the scope of legal 
protection provided to investors across 
countries and especially in emerging markets 
and their effects on corporate governance 
performance.  
 
The lack of transparency and publicly 
available information is another major 
problem with emerging markets. Millar et al. 
(2005) point out that the cost of investing 
increases in countries where the level of 
transparency is low.  After Enron and 
WorldCom corporate scandals the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act (SOX) was adopted that requires 
company to disclose detailed information 
regarding company financial statements. The 
Cadbury Report (1992) argues there is a 
danger in disclosing information that some 
companies may disclose incomplete or 
distorted information to mislead and confuse 
public as well as shareholders. Okpara 
(2011) empasises the importance of credible 
disclosure of corporate information. 
 
A high concentration of corporate ownership 
and family control is another fundamental 
problem of corporate governance in 
emerging market.  Millar et al (2005) argues 
that dominant family shareholders make the 
important decisions independently. They 
appoint the board members and there is a 
possible conflict of interest between 
managers, minority shareholders and them. 
Poker (2011) suggests that controlling 
shareholder may collude with managers to 
impound minority shareholder’s benefit 
particularly in developing countries with 
limited shareholders protection. Mork et al. 
(2000) also explain majority shareholders 
may follow objectives that are in conflict with 
those of minority shareholders. However, 
large shareholders may benefit minority 
shareholders as they are able to prevent the 
asset expropriation by managers.  Thus, the 
relationship between the concentration of 
ownership and corporate governance 
efficiency is intricate. 
 
Another problem with corporate governance 
in developing country is restriction of 
competition. Barriers to competition vary 
from anti-competitive practices by 
companies to entry restrictions. Khemani & 
Leechor (1999) suggest that entry 
impediments are normally disguised to 
regulations that purportedly protect the 
public interest. They suggest the lack of 
competition increases the concentration of 
ownership. 
 
Cadbury (1999)   points out the challenges in 
implementation of corporate governance 
principles are mainly due to complexity of 
ownership structure. He introduces the 
intertwining relationships between 
government, financial sector and corporation 
as a major challenge. In addition, a common 
pattern in the ownership structure of 
companies in developing countries is the 
dominance of institutional and family own 
businesses. Cadbury (1999) states, while this 
ownership pattern allows tight control of the 
firm, it also expropriate outside 
shareholders. Another problem with effective 
execution of successful corporate governance 
in regards to ownership structure is the 
massive privatization trends that has led to 
creation of new corporations that lack the 
legal and institutional structures required to 
operate in a global market. 
 
Emerging markets lacks the fundamental 
elements needed to operate in a competitive 
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market and there is no culture of compliance 
and enforcement. Insufficient competition 
strategy discourages new businesses to 
emerging market. In addition, the ambiguous 
laws and regulations and weak supervisory 
system deteriorate the quality of corporate 
governance. According to Setiawan (2007) 
outdated contract and insolvency laws 
hinder efficient operation and timely exit. 
Sometimes even if the laws are updated the 
enforcement are uneven and selective 
indicating misuse of official power. The 
malpractices of regulatory systems affect the 
creditworthy of the companies in emerging 
markets. Consequently, the institutional 
investors are reluctant to invest in these 
companies.  
 
The Impact of Culture on Corporate 
Governance 
 
Corporate governance plays an important 
role in creating a sound relationship between 
managers, shareholders, board of directors 
and other stakeholders. According to Cheung 
&  Chan, (2007), understanding cultural 
differences among different nations is 
significantly important as different 
nationalities solve their problems, interact 
with each other and run their businesses 
differently. The quality of corporate 
governance depends highly on the effective 
interaction and negotiation among 
concerned parties. According to Chan and 
Cheung (2008) culture plays an important 
role in establishing a productive negotiation 
among people.  
 
There are various studies to explore the 
relationships between national culture and 
corporate governance. Licht (2001) states 
culture influences the organizational policies 
through the values held by decision makers. 
He suggests culture contributes to the 
interpersonal relationship of individuals and 
institutions relationships and consequently 
changes the choice of corporate governance 
structure. 
 
Licht, Goldschmidt, & Schwartz (2004) study 
the effects of culture on three social norm of 
governance. They are: the rule of law, non-
corruption level, and democratic 
accountability. La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
Shleifer, & Vishny (1998) also found a 
noteworthy relationship between legal 
system and culture.   
 
Various studies have been conducted to 
examine the relationship between culture 
and corporate governance. Salzmann & 
Breuer (2005) state differences on investors’ 
objectives, ownership structure, corporate 
boards and hostile takeovers and protection 
of minority shareholders are the reasons for 
the differences in corporate governance 
systems across countries.  De Jong & 
Semenov (2006) explain significant 
relationships between corporate control, 
ownership structure, protection of minority 
shareholders and cultural dimension of 
Hofstede. Li & Harrison (2008) used 
Hofstede model to explain the structure of 
corporate boards.   
 
The Implication of Culture in Adopting 
Corporate Governance 
 
The power distance dimension of culture 
proposed by Hofstede has implication in 
effective adoption of corporate governance in 
emerging markets. In emerging markets, 
power has been distributed unequally among 
the member of the society. In societies with 
high power distance ordinary people are 
afraid of disagreeing with managers and they 
comply with managers decisions (Hofstede, 
1984). In contrast, societies with low PDI 
people are more willing to disagree with 
authorities. In addition, managers in this kind 
of societies ask for the opinions of those at 
the lower levels. In low power distance 
culture, people think everyone should be 
treated in the same way and executives 
should not take advantage of them. 
According to Chan & Cheung (2008) it is 
harder to accomplish good corporate 
governance practices through negotiation 
when there is a big inequality gap between 
powerful and ordinary people. Thus, low PDI 
countries would have high overall corporate 
governance practices compare to the high 
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PDI countries. The main reason is that the 
managers need to satisfy the demands of the 
investors to attract investment and to 
establish a balance between powerful and 
powerless. The other aspect of cultural 
dimension is Individualism Index (IDV).  
Countries where rated as high in IDV, people 
focus on them and give personal thought 
before investment. They are less influenced 
by any group or community decisions. 
Demand for more information, transparency 
and good financial performance are common 
in this culture. Therefore, good corporate 
governance is a norm in industries. Countries 
where IDV is low, the investors and 
managers are influenced by traditional 
authorities, roles and social duties. The level 
of Uncertainty Avoidance Index (UAI) and 
Masculinity (MAS) also determine the 
effectiveness of corporate governance. Low 
in UAI tells that the community is less 
tolerance to uncertainty and stakeholders are 
open for change and good corporate 
governance. In high UAI, it is easy to notice 
strong desire to follow the existing corporate 
set up. This community is conservative and 
obeys the social system. It will be difficult to 
make changes to implement better corporate 
governance. In the dimension of MAS, if a 
country displays less in MAS, the managers 
treat them as ordinary employees and 
concerned about social welfare. In this type 
of country, good corporate governance is 
common. 
 
As most of the emerging market falls on high 
PDI, low on IDV (Collectivist), high in UAI and 
low in MAS as per Hofstede classification of 
cultural dimensions, it is common to notice 
weak corporate governance practices. In 
order to attract investors and to be reliable, it 
is important to create a good corporate 
culture of corporate governance and to 




Corporate governance has increasingly 
attracted the attentions of scholars and 
business people. Recent corporate 
governance scandals at prominent 
companies have shaken the confidence of the 
investors. Emerging markets are extensively 
known for their poor corporate governance. 
Numerous researches have attempted to  
 
explain the barriers to implementation of 
effective corporate governance in these 
countries. Almost all the researches 
acknowledge the impact of the national 
culture on effective implementation of the 
corporate governance.  The quality of 
corporate governance is more important to 
countries in emerging markets as these 
countries are in desperate need for foreign 
investment to improve their economic 
growth. Many scholars have tried to explain 
the national culture and its impact on 
corporate governance. Various studies have 
attempted to examine the impact of culture 
on corporate governance system by applying 
Hofstede’s and Schwartz’s cultural models. 
All the studies indicate a strong correlation 
between national culture and corporate 
governance system. As most of the emerging 
market falls on high PDI, low on IDV 
(Collectivist), high in UAI and low in MAS as 
per Hofstede classification of cultural 
dimensions, it is common to notice weak 
corporate governance practices thus 
adoption of good corporate governance is 
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